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SUPREME COURT SLAMS THE DOOR ON THE
PRESS: MEDIA "RIDE-ALONG" FOUND
UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN WILSON V. LAYNE
INTRODUCTION
On May 24, 1999, the United States Supreme Court effectively
canceled "Cops" and other like television shows.1 In Wilson v.
Layne, a unanimous Court held that it is a violation of the Fourth
Amendment for law enforcement officers to bring members of the
media or other third parties into a home during the execution of a
warrant when the presence of the third parties in the home was not
in aid of the execution of the warrant.2 It appears, at the very least,
the Court's ruling could crimp some "reality" television shows
The 1990's have seen an increase in societal interest in law
enforcement activities, and with it, the demand for "reality"
television.4 "Cops," for example, is syndicated to over 90% of the
U.S. market.' Now in its twelfth season, the series has profiled
more than 120 law enforcement agencies in 140 different cities and
counties and has filmed in Hong Kong, London, Moscow,
Leningrad and Central and South America.6 The practice of media
participation during the execution of a search warrant and other
law enforcement activities, however, has become increasingly
controversial. The Supreme Court's recent decision appears to
have put an end to this controversy, at least with respect to private
homes.
1 "Cops" is a FOX Television Broadcast, Barbour/Langley Productions, Inc.
This show contains actual footage taken by camera crews that accompany police
officers while on patrol.
2 Wilson v. Layne, No. 98-83, 1999 WL 320817 (U.S. May 27, 1999).
3 David G. Savage, Police Can't Bring Media Into Homes, Court Rules
Privacy: Search warrants allow officers to enter but not to waive rights, justices
say. Decision could crimp some 'reality-based' TV shows, L.A. Times, May 25,
1999 at A24. "Reality" television programs feature actual footage of police
during the performance of their duties.
4 G. Beato, CULTURE WATCH: Why Reality Based Entertainment is Bad
For Reality, Newsday, May 17, 1998 at B06.
5 Anne Torpey-Kemph, Fox Renews Cops, Mediaweek, April 5, 1999 (pg.
unvailable).
6 Id.
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This Comment will examine the Supreme Court's decision in
Wilson v. Layne. Although no Federal Circuit decision has ever
upheld the constitutionality of a warranted search where the media
was present for non-law enforcement purposes, the Supreme
Court's decision is notable in several respects. First, although
finding the officers violated the Fourth Amendment by permitting
the media ride-along, the Court failed to address whether the
reporters too infringed on the Wilsons' right of privacy. Next, the
Court's oversight of the clear purpose and history of the Fourth
Amendment lead to an erroneous conclusion on the issue of
qualified immunity. Furthermore, while obviously having a
significant impact on media presence during the execution of a
warrant, the Court's decision may also effect other third parties
present but not aiding in the warrant's execution. In addition to
addressing the decision's effect on the media, this paper will also
examine the implications of the Court's holding on police trainees
and other third parties who previously accompanied officers
without express or implied authorization.
I. BACKGROUND
A. History and Purpose of the Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution secures the right of
citizens to be protected from unreasonable searches and seizures.7
It provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.'
7 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
8 Id.
[Vol. IX:353
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As noted in Supreme Court jurisprudence, "[t]he central purpose
of the Fourth Amendment is to safeguard the privacy and security
of individuals against arbitrary invasions by government
officials,"9 especially from unreasonable intrusions of the home.1"
When discussing the Fourth Amendment it is important not to lose
sight of the core values it was designed to protect. The Fourth
Amendment is "an American extension of the English tradition that
a man's house [is] his castle.""2 In 1766, William Pitt made an
impassioned defense of private homeowners against discretionary
governmental searches before Parliament:
The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to
all the forces of the crown. It may be frail; its roof
may shake; the wind may blow through it; the storm
may enter; but the king of England may not enter;
all his force dares not cross the threshold of the
ruined tenement. 3
These values and ideals have persisted and are still highly valued
today, as evidenced by the Court's decision in Wilson. Although
"[tihe government's right to intrude upon the privacy of the home
is narrowly circumscribed by the Fourth Amendment's prohibition
of unreasonable searches and seizures,"' 4 certain threshold
requirements must be satisfied before the Amendment's protections
are applicable to a particular situation."
9 South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 377 (1975) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (citations omitted).
10 Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S 753, 761-762 (1985) (holding that "the sanctity
of private dwellings [is] normally afforded the most stringent Fourth
Amendment protection").
I1 Wison v. Layne, 141 F.3d 111, 121 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (Mumaghan,
J., dissenting).
12 Id. (citing William Cuddihy & B. Carmon Hardy, A Man's House Was Not
His Castle: Origins of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
37 Win. & Mary Q. 371,400 (1980)).
13 Id. (citing Cuddihy & Hardy, supra note 12, at 386).
14 Id. at 122.
15 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
1999]
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Fourth Amendment protection applies when the government
conducts a search that violates a citizen's reasonable expectation of
privacy. 6 Therefore, for media presence during a search to violate
the Fourth Amendment, one must demonstrate a subjective
expectation of privacy that society is willing to recognize as
reasonable.' 7 Furthermore, one must show that the person's present
are governmental actors participating in the execution of the search
warrant. 8  When this two-prong test is satisfied, Fourth
Amendment protections apply. If the Fourth Amendment is
applicable to the search, one must demonstrate that the search was
unreasonable to successfully prove a violation of his/her
constitutional rights. 9
B. Federal Courts Find Media Ride-Alongs Unconstitutional
Prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Wilson,
three Federal Appellate Courts addressed the issue of whether a
media ride-along in a home violate the Fourth Amendment. 0
None of the Circuits had ever upheld the constitutionality of a
16 Id.
17 Id. For a more complete discussion on the subjective expectation of
privacy, see Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment,
58 Minn. L. Rev. 349, 384 (1972) (arguing subjective expectation has no place
in Fourth Amendment analysis); Melvin Gutterman, A Formulation of the Value
and Means Models of the Fourth Amendment in the Age of Technologically
Enhanced Surveillance, 39 Syracuse L. Rev. 647, 665 (1988) (arguing that post-
Katz cases reduce the scope of the amendment's protection); Lewis R. Katz, In
Search of a Fourth Amendment for the Twenty-first Century, 65 Ind. L.J. 549,
560 & nn.50-52 (1990) (discussing Harlan's view and cataloguing authorities).
18 Burdeau v. McDonald, 256 U.S. 465, 470-74 (1921); See also Brad M.
Johnston, Note, The Media's Presence During the Execution of a Search
Warrant: A Per Se Violation of the Fourth Amendment, 58 Ohio State L.J. 1499,
1509 (1997) (citing ROBERT M. BLOOM & MARK S. BRODIN, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 20 (2d ed. 1996)).
19 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The text of the Fourth Amendment makes it
clear that all searches must be reasonable. Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d 680, 684
(2d Cir. 1994) cert. denied, -- U.S. --, 115 S.Ct. 1689 (1995).
20 Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d 680; Parker v. Boyer, 93 F.3d 445 (8th Cir.
1996) cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1081 (1997); Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505 (9th
Cir. 1997), cert. granted, Berger v. Hanlon, No. 97-1927, 1999 WL 320818
(U.S. 1999).
356 [Vol. IX:353
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warranted search where the media was present for non-law
enforcement purposes, and where the videotaping and sound
recording were outside the scope of the warrant.21 Nonetheless, a
brief review of these cases is important in that each court reached
its holding through varying Fourth Amendment analysis, or a
complete lack thereof.
1. Ayeni v. Mottola
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the issue of
media ride-alongs in Ayeni v. Mottola 2 On March 5, 1992, Secret
Service Agent Mottola obtained a warrant to search the Ayeni's
home for evidence of credit card fraud.23 At 6:00 p.m., Mrs. Ayeni
and her son were home alone when six agents arrived, without a
warrant, to search the home.24 The officers knocked on the ddor
and announced that they were police conducting an investigation.
Mrs. Ayeni, wearing a dressing gown, opened the door slightly
when one agent pushed her out of the way and the first wave of
agents entered the apartment.26 The officers conducted an
aggressive search of the premises before the warrant arrived some
twenty-five minutes later.27
At approximately 8:15 p.m., Mottola arrived with the warrant.
More importantly, he was accompanied by three members of a
CBS television crew who filmed the agents as they searched the
21 Berger, 129 F.3d at 511; See also Wilson, 1999 WL 320817, at *10 n.1
(Stevens, J., concurring).
22 35 F.3d 680.
23 Id. at 683. The warrant was based on information obtained from a
confidential source that Babatunde Ayeni, Tawa's husband, was engaged in
credit card fraud.
24 Id. The six agents included four or five Secret Service agents and one or
two Postal Service Inspectors.
25 Id.
26 Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d at 683.
27 Id. Mrs. Ayeni asked to see the warrant when the search began. An agent
informed her that they were waiting for the warrant to arrive; whether the agents
halted the search until its arrival is unclear. At 7:50 p.m., the agents were
notified by radio that the warrant had just been signed, almost two hours after
the search had begun.
28 Id. The warrant authorized Mottola and any authorized officer of the
United States to enter and search the Ayenis' apartment.
1999]
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Ayenis' apartment.2 9 Mrs. Ayeni objected to the videotaping of the
search and attempted to cover her son's and her own face with a
magazine.3" Mottola grabbed the magazine from Ayeni's hand,
threw it on the ground, and told Ayeni's crying son to "shut up.'
A member of the search team explicitly instructed the CBS crew to
videotape Mrs. Ayeni's face. 3' During the twenty minute taping,
the camera crew documented the agents searching Ayenis' books,
photographs, financial statements, and personal letters.33 The three-
hour search recovered nothing more than a photograph of the
Ayeni family.34 CBS never broadcast the footage. 31
Mrs. Ayeni and her son filed suit against CBS and Mottola for
violating their Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures." The Ayenis' claimed 1) their
privacy was invaded by the presence of unauthorized persons in
their home; and 2) the search was excessively intrusive.37 Mottola
filed a motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity.38 After the
district court denied his motion, Mottola filed an interlocutory
appeal with the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
29 Id. The CBS television crew was from the weekly newsmagazine program
"Street Stories."
30 Id.
31 Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d at 683.
32 Id. It is unclear whether Mottola or another agent instructed the crew to
film Mrs. Ayeni's face.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 684.
35 Id.
36Id
37 Id.
38 See Ayeni v. CBS, Inc., 848 F. Supp. 362, 364 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) af'd,
Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d 680 cert. denied, -- U.S. --, 115 S.Ct. 1689 (1995).
Government officials are entitled to qualified immunity from civil damages if
their conduct does not violate clearly established federal rights of which a
reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818
(1982). For a complete discussion on the qualified immunity aspect of this case
see Michael N. Levy, Comment, The Price of Fame: Should Law Enforcement
Officers Who Permit Camera Crews to Film The Execution of a Search Warrant
in a Private Home Be Held Liable for Civil Damages?, 92 NWU L.R. 1153
(Spring 1998).
358 Vol. I :353
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Circuit.39 The Second Circuit affirmed the decision of the District
Court concluding the complaint sufficiently alleged Fourth
Amendment violations to withstand a motion to dismiss based on
qualified immunity.4"
The Second Circuit first addressed whether the Ayenis' Fourth
Amendment rights were violated by the unauthorized presence of
the film crew in their home. 1 The opening line of its opinion
recognized the tension between the public's right to information
and the individuals' interest in privacy. "The quest of television
reporters for on-the-scene coverage of dramatic events and the
interest of law enforcement agencies in promoting their own image
have combined to present for decision an appeal with important
consequences for the right of privacy of those inside a home. ' 2 In
finding the officers violated the Fourth Amendment, the court
emphasized the reasonableness prong of the analysis.43 This
requirement not only prevents government agents from conducting
searches based on unreasonable grounds, but "ensure[s]
reasonableness in the manner and scope of searches and seizures
that are carried out...."' The court further noted "[t]he home has
properly been regarded as among the most highly protected zones
of privacy...."" When searches of the home are permitted, the
officers in searching the home are limited to either "(a) actions
expressly authorized by the warrant,46 or (b) such further actions as
are impliedly authorized because they are reasonably related to
39 Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d at 684.
40 Id. at 691.
41 Id. at 684.
42 Id. at 682-83.
43 Id.
44 Id. (citing Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)); Tennessee v.
Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1985)).
45 Id. (citing Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 761-62 (1985)); Payton v. New
York, 445 U.S. 573, 585, 589-90 (1980) (stating that "physical entry of the
home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is
directed").
46 Id. (citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Narcotic Agents of the Federal Bureau
of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 394 n.7 (1971) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment confines
an officer executing a search warrant strictly within the bounds set by the
warrant....")).
3591999]
7
Kowalczyk: Supreme Court Slams the Door on the Press: Media "Ride-Along" Fou
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPAUL J. ART& ENT. LAW
accomplishing additional legitimate law enforcement objectives,
such as ensuring the safety of the searching officers and effectively
responding as law enforcement officers to circumstances that might
arise during the course of the search." "
The court held that the camera crew had neither express nor
implied authorization to be present during the search of the Ayeni
home.48 With respect to express authorization, Mottola's warrant
permitted "James Mottola and any Authorized Officer of the
United States" to search the Ayeni home.49 The warrant allowed for
the search and seizure of any documents related to the suspected
credit card fraud, but did not permit the presence of the crew or the
video or audio taping of the search."0 Furthermore, "there is no
claim that the presence of the CBS camera crew served any
legitimate law enforcement purpose." '  The presence of the
camera crew was thus unreasonable because the warrant failed
either to expressly or impliedly permit it.
Mottola argued that there are no decisions that expressly forbid
officers from allowing the media to join and film their search of a
home, thus, there is no clearly established ruled prohibiting the
act." The court found this argument to lack merit. According to
the court, "it has been a long established principle that the
objectives of the Fourth Amendment are to preserve the right of
privacy to the maximum extent consistent with reasonable exercise
of law enforcement duties."53 Mottola's actions "exceeded well-
established principles" by allowing the CBS camera crew to
accompany him on the search without express or implied
authorization.54
47 Id. (citing Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981) (detaining
occupants while search is in progress); United States v. Barlin, 686 F.2d 81, 87
(2d Cir. 1982) (limited search of individual on premises as self-protective
measure)).
48 Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d at 686.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d at 686.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
360 [Vol. IX:353
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The unauthorized presence of the media was not only lacking
justification, but, according to the court, Mottola's conduct was
"calculated to inflict injury on the very value that the Fourth
Amendment seeks to protect - the right of privacy."55 The filming
of the search did nothing more than "magnify needlessly the
impairment of their right of privacy. 5 6 The court concluded "a
private home is not a soundstage for law enforcement theatricals." 57
Next, the Second Circuit addressed the issue of whether the
officers conducted the search in an unreasonably intrusive
manner.58 The Court held the scope of the search was excessively
broad because the camera crew videotaped Mrs. Ayeni and her son,
personal documents and other items "unnecessary to the purpose of
the search - to discover materials related to an alleged credit card
fraud scheme."'59 Because the search for documents involves the
review of personal materials and effects, such searches must be
"'conducted in a manner that minimizes unwarranted intrusions
upon privacy."'" The court was stunned that "unauthorized
persons with no business being in the home at all," were viewing
and recording the personal effects of a private citizen.6
In summary, the Second Circuit held that the presence of an
unauthorized camera crew during the search was unreasonable and
thus violated the Ayenis' Fourth Amendment rights. The court
concluded that the presence of the camera crew was unreasonable
because the warrant failed to expressly or impliedly permit the
media's presence. Furthermore, the officers conducted the search
in an unreasonably intrusive manner.
55 Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d at 686.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d at 688.
59 Id. There were no claims that the videotaping served any legitimate law
enforcement purpose. The sole purpose of the videotaping was "to seize images
and sounds of the Ayeni home, and of the Ayenis themselves, that were
intended for public viewing by television audiences across the country." Id.
60 Id. (citation omitted).
61 Id.
1999)
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2. Parker v. Boyer
In 1996, the Eighth Circuit addressed the issue of media ride-
alongs in Parker v. Boyer.62 On February 9, 1994, at 9:30 p.m., a
reporter and a cameraman from KSDK, a local St. Louis, Missouri,
television station joined police officers on a search of Travis
Martin's home.63 The warrant authorized the police to search for
drugs, weapons, currency and drug transaction records.' Although
they found several weapons, the police never brought any charges
against Mr. Martin.6' Nonetheless, KSDK broadcast the tapes on
several news programs.66
Sandra and Dana Parker, relatives of Mr. Martin and residents of
the home, filed claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the officers
who conducted the search and the television station whose crew
entered the home.67 The district court granted summary judgment
for the Parkers against the police on their Fourth Amendment
claims and granted summary judgment in favor of the television
station.68 The parties appealed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.69 The appellate court affirmed the
district court's decision in favor of the television station.7' It
reasoned the reporting crew was not acting under color of state law
when it entered the private home, and reversed the district court's
finding of liability against the police officers on grounds of
qualified immunity.71
The Eighth Circuit's opinion lacked any significant discussion on
the constitutionality of allowing the media to accompany law
62 93 F.3d 445.
63 Id. at 446.
64 See Parker v. Clarke, 905 F. Supp. 638, 640-41 (E.D. Mo. 1995), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part sub nom. Parker v. Boyer, 93 F.3d 445 (8th Cir. 1995). cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 1081 (1997).
65 Id. All the weapons discovered were legally registered.
66 Id.
67 Parker v. Boyer, 93 F.3d at 446.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.
[Vol. IX:353
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enforcement officers during the execution of a search warrant.72
Although neglecting to answer the question of whether a Fourth
Amendment violation occurred, the court did note that "most
courts have rejected the argument that the United States
Constitution forbids the media to encroach on a person's property
while the police search it.""3  In contrast, however, it recognized
the Second Circuit's ruling in Ayeni that clearly established
constitutional law forbids the presence of the media within a
private dwelling during law enforcement execution of a search
warrant.74 Absent these superficial observations, the Eight Circuit
failed to rule on the Fourth Amendment issue.
3. Berger v. Hanlon
Finally, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the issue
of media ride-alongs in Berger v. Hanlon." This case was granted
certiorari and consolidated with Wilson v. Layne for argument
before the United States Supreme Court.76
72 In his concurring opinion, District Judge Rosenbaum recognized that the
court had failed to determine whether the defendants violated Parker's Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. In
agreement with the Second Circuit's decision in Ayeni, Judge Rosenbaum found
that police executing a search warrant violate a resident's Fourth Amendment
rights when the police allow media to enter the resident's home without first
securing the residents express consent. Id. at 448.
73 Id. at 447. The court cited four cases: Avenson v. Zegart, 557 F. Supp. 958
(D.Minn. 1984) (holding no reasonable expectation of privacy because the
puppy mill searched was open land); Moncrief v. Hanton, 10 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 1620 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (holding that photographs taken by the media
during the execution of a search warrant was not a violation because the
Constitution does not guarantee the right to be free from unwanted publicity);
Higbee v. Times-Advocate, 5 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2372 (S.D. Cal. 1980)
(holding that the media's publishing of photographs taken during a search did
not violate § 1983 because there was no "gross abuse."); and Prahl v. Brosamle,
295 N.W.2d 768 (Wisc. Ct. App. 1980) (holding an unauthorized filming of a
search did not violate § 1983 because the broadcaster was acting independently
and not under color of state law).
74 Id.
75 129 F.3d 505 (9th Cir. 1997).
76 Hanlon v. Berger, 525 U.S. (1998).
1999]
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A9 in the previous cases, the Ninth Circuit held the search of the
Bergers' residence violated their Fourth Amendment rights against
unreasonable searches and seizures.77 In 1993, former employees
of the Bergers informed the United States Fish and Wildlife
Service ("USFWS") they had witnessed Mr. Berger poison or
shoot eagles a few years earlier.78 The USFWS began an
investigation into the allegations. After learning of the
investigation, Cable News Network, Inc. and CNN employee Jack
Hamann, together with Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. and TBS
employees Robert Rainey and Donald Hooper entered into an
agreement with Assistant United States Attorney McLean to film
the search for the networks' environmental programs. 79  In
exchange for use of the footage on their environmental shows
77 129 F.3d at 510.
78 Id. at 508.
79 Id. The following letter agreement was executed by Assistant U.S.
Attorney McLean and Jack Hamann on CNN letterhead:
Dear Mr. McLean:
This confirms our agreement that the United States Attorney's Office
for the District of Montana agrees to allow CNN to accompany
USFWS Agents as they attempt to execute a criminal search warrant
near Jordan, Montana, some time during the week of March 22, 1993.
Except as provided below, CNN shall have complete editorial control
over any footage it shoots; it shall not be obliged to use the footage;
and does not waive any rights or privileges it may have with respect to
the footage.
In return, CNN agrees to embargo the telecast of any videotape of
the attempt to execute the search warrant until either: (1) a jury has
been empaneled and instructed by a judge not to view television reports
about the case; or (2) the defendant waives his right to a jury trial and
agrees to have his case tried before a judge; or (3) a judge accepts a
plea bargain; or (4) the government decides not to bring charges
relating to the attempt to execute the search warrant.
Please acknowledge your agreement to the foregoing by executing
the signature line below.
Sincerely, Jack Hamann, Correspondent, CNN Environment Unit.
Acknowledged signature of Kris McLean, Assistant United States
Attorney for the District of Montana, Helena, Montana.
cc: Jennifer Falk Weiss, CNN Legal Department.
Chet Burgess, CNN Environment Unit.
364 [Vol. IX:353
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"Earth Matters" and "Network Earth," the government gained
publicity for its efforts to combat environmental crime."
In March of 1993, a magistrate judge issued a search warrant for
the Bergers' ranch, and "appurtenant structures, excluding the
residence, for evidence indicating the taking of wildlife."'"
According to the testimony of the Bergers and without contention
otherwise by the media or U.S. Attorney's Office, the magistrate
judge had no knowledge of the planned media participation."
On the morning of the search, the media members and
government team met on a country road to discuss the execution of
the warrant before they proceeded to the ranch.83 Mr. Berger met
USFWS Special Agent Joel Scrafford, who was wearing a hidden
microphone, and the two consentually entered the Berger home.84
The Bergers were not informed that Agent Scrafford was wearing a
microphone or that the camera present during the search belonged
to the media."5 The media broadcast portions of the eight hours of
video footage and sound recordings made in the Bergers' house.86
Mr. Berger was charged with various violations of § 16 of the
United States Code and with the use of a registered pesticide in a
manner inconsistent with its labeling. 7 Prior to trial, the
magistrate judge denied Mr. Berger's motion to suppress evidence
on the grounds that the agents lacked probable cause for the search
and that the warrant did not accurately describe the property to be
searched. 8 Mr. Berger was acquitted of all charges, except the
misdemeanor charge of using a pesticide contrary to its labeling. 9
The Ninth Circuit began its discussion on the Fourth Amendment
by stating that "[tihis was no ordinary search."9 From the outset,
80 Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d at 507-508.
81 Id. at 508.
82 Id. at 508-509.
83 Id.
84 Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d at 509.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d at 509.
90 Id. at 510.
1999] 365
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the intended purpose of the media presence was for reasons other
than those related to law enforcement." According to the court,
and documented by a written contract, the media's purpose was to
obtain material for their commercial programming.92 Nonetheless,
the agents obtained the warrant without disclosing to the magistrate
judge the planned presence of the media or its purpose.9 3
The agents and media claimed that the Bergers' privacy was not
invaded because their cameras shot footage only from the open
fields of the shed and other outbuildings on the ranch where the
Bergers' had no reasonable expectation of privacy.94 The court
quickly rejected this argument and stated that "[t]he open fields
doctrine is not a license for the police to bring trespassers on
private property" and certainly "does not immunize the officers
from liability for conduct that has no law enforcement purpose."9"
Furthermore, the court noted that the record indicated that the shed
and other buildings were places where the Bergers did have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in that "they were located close
to the house and guarded by a dog."96
The court next addressed the issue of whether the media's
conduct amounted to governmental action.97 Private parties may
be held liable in a Bivens action for violation of the Constitution if
they are deemed to have acted "under color of law."98 Applying
the joint action test, the court stated the test is satisfied when "the
plaintiff is able to establish an agreement, or conspiracy between
the government actor and a private party. '99
In the present case, the parties not only had a verbal agreement,
but a written contractual agreement."° Furthermore, it was alleged
91 Id.
92 Id. See supra note 79.
93 Id. at 510-11.
94 Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d at 512.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 512-13.
97 Id. at 514.
98 Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d at 514. Private persons act "under color of
law" when engaging in a joint activity with state actors. See Lugar v. Edmonson
Oil Co. 457 U.S. 922, 941 (1982).
99 Id. (citations omitted).
100 Id. at 515. See supra note 79.
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that the government shared confidential information with the
media."°1  The court noted that the agents engaged in
"conversations with Mr. Berger for the purpose of providing
interesting soundbites, and to portray themselves as tough, yet
caring investigators."1 °2 In finding the existence of a joint action,
the court concluded "the government officers planned and executed
the search in a manner designed to enhance its entertainment value
.... rather than to further their investigation."
°10 3
The court next addressed the qualified immunity issue.
Government agents are entitled to qualified immunity "if they
could have reasonably believed that their conduct violated no
clearly established federal statutory or constitutional right.""0 4 In
its analysis, the Ninth Circuit reviewed prior Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence to determine if the government agents could have
reasonably believed their conduct was lawful."°5 The court, citing
Ayeni, held the agents were not entitled to qualified immunity." 6
In Ayeni, the Second Circuit held that that although there was no
reported decision expressly forbidding the government from
allowing a media ride-along during the execution of a warrant, no
reasonable officer could have thought it permissible in light of 18
U.S.C. § 3105.107 Thus, based on the reasoning of Ayeni, the Ninth
Circuit held that the agents were not entitled to qualified
immunity.10
8
In summary, the Ninth Circuit found the search of the Bergers'
ranch unreasonable. 9 It concluded that the search was a joint
operation between the government and media intended to serve a
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d at 514.
104 Id. at 511 (citations omitted).
105 Id. at 511-12.
106 Id. at 512.
107 Id. (citing Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d 680). 18 U.S.C. § 3105 (1994)
states: "A search warrant may in all cases be served by any of the officers
mentioned in its direction or by an officer authorized by law to serve such
warrant, but by no other person, except in aid of the officer on his requiring it,
he being present and acting in its execution."
108 Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d at 512.
109 Id. at 510.
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major purpose other than law enforcement. l0 Furthermore, the
court held the government agents were not entitled to qualified
immunity because a reasonable officer should have determined that
media presence during an execution was unlawful."' Thus, the
Ninth Circuit concluded that the government and media violated
the Bergers' Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures."1 On March 24, 1999, the United States
Supreme Court heard oral arguments on this case. 3
II. SUBJECT OPINION: WILSON V. LA YNE
A. Facts
On April 16, 1992, federal and state law enforcement agents
engaged in a joint effort to apprehend a fugitive for probation
violations.'1 4  Dominic Wilson was identified as a dangerous
fugitive and a target of "Operation Gunsmoke." s According to
this special national fugitive apprehension program, Wilson had
violated his probation on three previous felony charges.11
6
The Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Maryland issued
three arrest warrants, one for each of Dominic Wilson's probation
violations." 7 The warrants were addressed to "any duly authorized
peace officer.""' They made no mention of media presence during
the arrest. 9
110 Id.
111 Id. at 512.
112 Id. at 510.
113 Hanlon v. Berger consolidate for oral arguments with Wilson v. Layne,
Nos. 97-1927, 98-83, 1999 WL 187365 (U.S. March 24, 1999).
114 Wilson v. Layne, No. 98-83, 1999 WL 187365, at *3.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Wilson v. Layne, No. 98-83, 1999 WL 187365, at *3. In all relevant
respects, the warrants were identical. By way of example, the Court cited the
following:
The State of Maryland, to any duly authorized peace officer, greeting: you
are hereby commanded to take Dominic Jerome Wilson, if he/she shall be found
in your bailiwick, and have him immediately before the Circuit Court for
Montgomery County, now in session, at the Judicial Center, in Rockville, to
368 [Vol. IX:353
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At around 6:45 a.m., Deputy United States Marshals and
Montgomery County Police officers, joined by a Washington Post
reporter and a photographer as part of a Marshall's Service ride-
along policy, entered the suspected home of Dominic Wilson.
12 1
Dominic Wilson's parents, Charles and Geraldine, were asleep in
bed when they heard the officers enter the home.' Charles
Wilson, dressed only in briefs, ran into the living room to
investigate the disturbance and found at least five men dressed in
street clothes with their guns drawn.22 The officers did not
identify themselves as law enforcement officials. 2 1 Mr. Wilson
angrily demanded that the men state their business and repeatedly
cursed the officers. 4 The officers subdued Mr. Wilson on the
floor.' Geraldine Wilson, dressed in a sheer nightgown, entered
the living room to investigate.2 6  The officers questioned the
Wilsons about their son's whereabouts. 127  Mr. Wilson told the
officers that he was not Dominic, that his son did not live there,
and he had not seen Dominic for over two weeks.' Mrs. Wilson
identified Charles as her husband and confirmed his statement that
his son was not present at the residence.2 9 After completing their
protective sweep of the house, the officers realized that the subject
of the warrant, Dominic Wilson, was not in the home. 30
answer an indictment, or information, or criminal appeals unto the State of
Maryland, of and concerning a certain charge of Robbery [Violation of
Probation] by him committed, as hath been presented, and so forth. Hereof fail
not at your peril, and you then and there this writ. Witness. (citation omitted).
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Brief For Petitioners at 4, Wilson v. Layne, 1998 WL 901778 (U.S.) (No.
98-83).
124 Id.
125 Wilson v. Layne, Nos. 98-83, 1999 WL 187365, at *3.
126 Id.
127 Brief For Petitioners at 4, Wilson v. Layne, 1998 WL 901778 (U.S.) (No.
98-83).
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Wilson v. Layne, Nos. 98-83, 1999 WL 187365, at *3.
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During the course of the event, the Washington Post reporters
observed and photographed what transpired."' The print reporter
observed the confrontation in the living room between the police
and Charles Wilson, and the photographer took pictures of Mr.
Wilson while he was forcibly detained on the floor with a knee in
his back and a gun to his head.132 The Wilsons were not permitted
to cover themselves during the incident.133 The Washington Post
reporters performed their newsgathering duties but, "[a]t no time,
however, were [they] involved in the execution of the arrest
warrant." 134  The photographs taken by the Washington Post
reporter were never published.1
35
B. Procedural History
Charles and Geraldine brought a Bivens action in the District
Court of Maryland alleging the officer's action in bringing
members of the media into their home during the attempted
execution of the arrest warrant violated their Fourth Amendment
right against unreasonable searches and seizures. 136  The
government moved for summary judgment on qualified immunity
grounds, but it was denied by the district court.'37
On interlocutory appeal a divided Fifth Circuit reversed the
district court decision and found the law enforcement officers
entitled to qualified immunity. 38 The Wilsons filed for a rehearing
131 Id.
132 Brief For Petitioners at 5, Wilson v. Layne, 1998 WL 901778 (U.S.) (No.
98-83).
133 Id.
134 Wilson v. Layne, Nos. 98-83, 1999 WL 187365, at *3.
135 Id.
136 Id. at *4. In addition to the Bivens actions, the Wilsons also asserted
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Those claims were dismissed by the district
court. The district court also granted summary judgment on the Wilsons' Biven
claims that the law enforcement officials lacked probable cause to enter the
home and, when doing so, used excessive force. The Wilsons moved for entry
of final judgment on those claims. The court denied the motion. See Brief For
Petitioners at 6, Wilson v. Layne, 1998 WL 901778 (U.S.) (No. 98-83).
137 Id.
138 Id.
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and oral arguments were heard en banc September 30, 1997.139
Subsequently, one of the judges died and the case was argued again
en banc March 3, 1998.40 A divided court again upheld the
finding of qualified immunity.141 It reasoned that, at the time the
search occurred, no court had held that media presence during the
execution of a warrant in a private home violated the Fourth
Amendment, thus "the right allegedly violated by the petitioners
was not 'clearly established' and ... qualified immunity was
proper." '42 The Court of Appeals, however, declined to decide the
Fourth Amendment issue. 43
Five judges dissented arguing the officer's action constituted a
Fourth Amendment violation.' 44 Furthermore, "[tihe dissenters
concluded that since no reasonable officer could have believed that
allowing reporters into the home or allowing them to take pictures
was either authorized by the arrest warrant or reasonably necessary
to accomplish a legitimate law enforcement objective, [the
officers] were not entitled to qualified immunity."1 41
On November 9, 1998, the United States Supreme Court granted
the Wilsons' writ of certiorari limited to the issues of: 1) whether
law enforcement officers violate the Fourth Amendment by
allowing members of the news media to accompany them and to
observe and record their execution of a warrant and 2) whether, if
this action violates the Fourth Amendment, the officers are
nonetheless entitled to the defense of qualified immunity.46
Wilson v. Layne was consolidate with Berger v. Hanlon for oral
arguments. 47
139 Brief For Petitioners at 7, Wilson v. Layne, 1998 WL 901778 (U.S.) (No.
98-83).
140 Id.
141 Id. The final vote was 6 to 5 to reverse the district court's ruling.
142 Wilson v. Layne, Nos. 98-83, 1999 WI, 187365, at *4 (quoting Wilson,
141 F.3d 111).
143 Wilson v. Layne, Nos. 98-83, 1999 WL 187365, at *4.
144 Id.
145 Brief For Petitioners at 9, Wilson v. Layne, 1998 WL 901778 (U.S.) (No.
98-83).
146 Wilson v. Layne, 119 S.Ct. 443 (mem.).
147 Id.
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C. Supreme Court Review
1. Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court began its analysis by discussing the
requirements for qualified immunity.'48 The Wilsons sued the
Deputy United States Marshals under Bivens and the Montgomery
County Police officers under § 1983.149 Under both actions, the
qualified immunity analysis is identical. 5' To determine if
officials are entitled to qualified immunity, a court must "'first
determine whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an
actual constitutional right at all, and if so, proceed to determine
whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged
violation."'' Thus, in order to answer the qualified immunity
question, the Court first addressed the Fourth Amendment issue.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, began by
stating the Fourth Amendment embodies the "centuries-old
principle of respect for the privacy of the home. 1 52 Citing the
1604 English case Semayne v. Gresham,153 the Court observed that
"the house of every one is to him as his castle and fortress, as well
for his defence against injury and violence, as for his repose."
These basic Fourth Amendment principles have been applied in
cases similar to Wilson.1 54 In Payton v. New York, 155 for example,
police entered a private home to execute an arrest warrant. There,
the Court was "persuaded that the 'overriding respect for the
sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since
the origins of the Republic' meant that absent a warrant or exigent
circumstances, police could not enter a home to make an arrest."'156
The Court reasoned that although the officers in Wilson were
entitled to enter the home and attempt to execute the arrest warrant,
148 Wilson v. Layne, Nos. 98-83, 1999 WL 187365, at *4.
149 Id.
150 Id. (citations omitted).
151 Id. (quoting Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. ---, --- (1999) (slip op., at 4)).
152 Wilson v. Layne, Nos. 98-83, 1999 WL 187365, at *5.
153 Id. (quoting 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 5 Co. Rep. 91a, 91b, 195 (K.B.) (1604)).
154 Wilson v. Layne, Nos. 98-83, 1999 WL 187365, at *5.
155 Id. (citing 445 U.S. at 602 ).
156 Id. (quoting 445 U.S. at 602).
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"it does not necessarily follow that they were entitled to bring a
newspaper reporter and photographer with them."1 17 If the scope of
a search exceeds that expressly or impliedly permitted by the
warrant, the subsequent seizures are unconstitutional.15 In other
words, the actions of the participants must be related to the
objectives of the intrusion.
The Court stated the presence of Washington Post reporters
inside the Wilsons' home was not related to the objectives of the
intrusion. 9 Since the reporters were in the Wilsons' home for
their own purposes and not to aid in the apprehension of Dominic
Wilson, "they were not present for any reason related to the
justification for police entry into the home."'" Thus, the reporters
were not assisting the law enforcement officers in the execution of
the warrant."'
There are situations, however, where third parties are present to
aid in the execution of warrant. 62 In such cases, their presence is
lawful. 6 For example, the Court noted that third parties may
accompany law enforcement officers on a search to recover stolen
goods if the third party is there to identify the stolen property."6
The government argued the reporters were present to aid
legitimate law enforcement purposes and, therefore, they were
assisting in the search.6 First, it stated that officers should be
entitled to a reasonable amount of discretion in determining when
media presence furthers their law enforcement mission.'66 The
Court dismissed this argument as ignoring the core purpose of the
Fourth Amendment - the right of residential privacy. 67 The Court
reasoned that Fourth Amendment protections would be
157 Id. at *5.
158 Id. (citation omitted).
159 Wilson v. Layne, Nos. 98-83, 1999 WL 187365, at *6.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Wilson v. Layne, Nos. 98-83, 1999 WL 187365, at *6 (citation omitted).
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id.
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"significantly watered down" if such generalized law enforcement
objectives themselves were sufficient to trump the Amendment. 168
Next, the government argued that media presence aids in
informing the public of law enforcement efforts to combat crime.'69
Although recognizing the importance of the media's First
Amendment rights and their role in informing the public of law
enforcement activities, the Court stated "the Fourth Amendment
also protects a very important right, and in the present case it is in
terms of that right that the media ride-alongs must be judged."'70
The desire for good public relations and accurate reporting on
police issues does not justify intrusion into a private home."'
Finally, the government argued that the media's presence aided
in the reduction of police abuses and protected both the officers
and suspects from potential harm.' 72 Recognizing that in some
cases the presence of third parties may be constitutionally
permissible, the Court found that the media members in this case
were acting for private purposes. 173 "They were not there for the
purpose of protecting the officers, much less the Wilsons ...
evidenced in part by the fact that the newspaper and not the police
retained the photographs."174
The Supreme Court held that "it is a violation of the Fourth
Amendment for police to bring members of the media or other
third parties into a home during the execution of a warrant when
the presence of the third parties in the home was not in aid of the
execution of the warrant."'175
The Court then turned to the qualified immunity issue. Citing
Anderson v. Creighton,176 the Court stated that "'whether an official
protected by qualified immunity may be held personally liable for
168 Id.
169 Wilson v. Layne, Nos. 98-83, 1999 WL 187365, at *6.
170 Id.
171 Wilson v. Layne, Nos. 98-83, 1999 WL 187365, at *7.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 Wilson v. Layne, Nos. 98-83, 1999 WL 187365, at *7. (quoting 483 U.S.
635, 639 (1987)).
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an allegedly unlawful official action turns on the objective legal
reasonableness of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that
were clearly established at the time it was taken."' Thus, the issue
in this case is "whether a reasonable officer could have believed
bringing members of the media into a home during the execution
of an arrest warrant was lawful, in light of clearly established law
and the information the officers possessed.,
177
The Wilsons and the dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeals
argued that any violation of the Fourth Amendment is "clearly
established" because police actions are clearly restricted by Fourth
Amendment protections. 17' The Court rejected this notion stating
that before a court can determine if a right was clearly established,
the right allegedly violated must be defined at the "appropriate
level of specificity." 179  It concluded that in April 1992 the
violation in question had not been sufficiently defined to render it
clearly established. Thus, the Court held that "it was not
unreasonable for a police officer to have believed that bringing
media observers along during the execution of an arrest warrant
(even in a home) was lawful.""'0
First, although deciding that it was a Fourth Amendment
violation for police to bring third parties into a home during the
execution of a warrant when the third parties were not aiding in the
execution of the warrant, the Court said the issue was "by no
means open and shut."'' The question in this case was not
whether a valid warrant existed, rather whether the invitation
extended to the media exceeded the scope of the warrant. 8 2 The
Court stated that, in light of the importance of media coverage of
police activities, "it is not obvious from the general principles of
the Fourth Amendment that the conduct of the officers in this case
violated the Amendment."'83
177 Wilson v. Layne, Nos. 98-83, 1999 WL 187365, at *8.
178 Id.
179 Id. (citing Anderson, 483 U.S. at 123).
180 Wilson v. Layne, Nos. 98-83, 1999 WL 187365, at *8.
181 Id.
182 Id.
183 Id.
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Furthermore, in 1992 there were no published federal judicial
opinions holding that media presence was unlawful during the
execution of a warrant in a private home. 84 The only published
decision directly on point was a state intermediate court decision
finding such conduct was not unreasonable.'85 There existed two
unpublished federal District Court decisions addressing the issue,
but both of these courts applied an "unorthodox non-Fourth
Amendment right of privacy" theory.186 The Court concluded that
these cases were not enough to "clearly establish" a Fourth
Amendment violation."7
The Wilsons also pointed to the Sixth Circuit decision in Bills v.
Aseltine' 88 Due to the existence of general issues of material fact,
the Court of Appeals found summary judgment improper on the
question of whether law enforcement officers exceeded the scope
of a search warrant by allowing a private security guard to
accompany them on a search to identify stolen property other than
that described in the warrant.'89 Although the case was decided
five weeks prior to the search of the Wilson residence, the Supreme
Court stated that it "cannot say even in light of Bills, the law on
third-party entry into homes was clearly established in April
1992. ' 90 Due to the Wilsons failure to cite controlling authority in
their jurisdiction or a consensus of persuasive authority which
clearly established such actions as a Fourth Amendment violation,
the Court refused to deny the officers qualified immunity on this
basis.1 9'
184 Id. The Court noted, however, that apparently media ride-alongs had
become common practice according to Florida Supreme Court's decision in
Florida Publishing Co. v. Fletcher, 340 So.2d 914, 918 (1976).
185 Wilson v. Layne, Nos. 98-83, 1999 WL 187365, at *8. (citing Prahl, 295
N.W.2d at 782).
186 Id. at *8 (citing Moncrief, 10 Media L. Rptr. 1620; Higbee, 5 Media L.
Rptr. 2372).
187 Id. at *8.
188 Wilson v. Layne, Nos. 98-83, 1999 WL 187365, at *9 (citing Bills v.
Aseltine, 958 F.2d 697 (6th Cir. 1992)).
189 Id. at *9 (citing Bills, 958 F.2d at 709).
190 Id. at *9.
191 Id.
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Finally, the Court found the Marshals reliance on a Marshal
Service ride-along policy significant. It stated that "important to
our conclusion was the reliance by the United States marshals in
this case on a Marshal's Service ride-along policy....,,192  The
policy "explicitly contemplated that media who engaged in ride-
alongs might enter private homes with their cameras as part of
fugitive apprehension arrests." 193 Since the body of case law in the
area was undeveloped, the Court held it was not unreasonable for
the officers to rely on their formal ride-along policy.1 94
In conclusion, the Court stated that due to the lack of
development in this area of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, "the
officers in this case cannot have been 'expected to predict the
future course of constitutional law.""95 To support its holding, the
Court noted that since the search in Wilson a split developed
among the Federal Circuits regarding the issue of qualified
immunity.' 9' "If judges thus disagree on the constitutional
question, it is unfair to subject police to money damages for
picking the losing side of the controversy."' 97 The Supreme Court
affirmed the holding of the Fourth Circuit.' 98
2. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Stevens concurred with the majority's holding that it is a
Fourth Amendment violation for law enforcement officers to
permit third parties to enter a private residence during the
execution of a warrant, but dissented on the question of qualified
192 Id.
193 Wilson v. Layne, Nos. 98-83, 1999 WL 187365, at *9.
194 Id.
195 Id. (quoting Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 562 (1978)).
196 Id. (citations omitted).
197 Id.
198 Wilson v. Layne, Nos. 98-83, 1999 WL 187365, at *10. As noted, the
Supreme Court consolidated Wilson with Hanlon v. Berger. Regarding Berger,
the Supreme Court held that the police violated the Bergers Fourth Amendment
rights. However, since "the parties have not called our attention to any
decisions which would have made the state of law any clearer a year later," the
Court found the agents were entitled to qualified immunity. Thus, the Supreme
Court vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and
remanded the case for further proceedings. Hanlon v. Berger, No. 97-1927,
1999 WL 320818 (U.S. 1999).
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immunity.'99  Justice Stevens argues that, "[t]he clarity of the
constitutional rule, a federal statute (18 U.S.C. § 3105), common-
law decisions, and the testimony of the senior law enforcement
officer" all support the position that the officers violated a clearly
established right.2°"
According to Justice Stevens, the majority's opinion did not
announce new constitutional law, rather the Court "has refused to
recognize an entirely unprecedented request for an exception to a
well-established principle. Police action in the execution of a
warrant must be strictly limited to the objectives of the authorized
intrusion."2 '' Justice Stevens further stated that the officers'
argument that media presence serves a legitimate law enforcement
purpose is merely a post hoc rationalization.20 2  The Court's
rejection of such arguments cannot be characterized as a new rule
of law.2 °3
More importantly, Justice Stevens believed it should have been
obvious to the officers that permnitting the media to ride-along on a
search of a private residence exceeded the scope of the warrant.2 4
"Despite reaffirming that clear rule, the Court nonetheless finds
that the mere presence of a warrant rendered the officers' conduct
reasonable.""2 5  Although the Court found the officers' actions
reasonable, it failed to provide a single case to support such a
201proposition.
Next, Justice Stevens addressed the argument that prior to 1992
no judicial opinion held that officers violated the Fourth
Amendment by allowing members of the media to accompany
them on a search of a private home.2 7 He found such reasoning
"scant., 2 8  The majority cited three cases each holding police
199 Id. (Stevens, J., concuning in part and dissenting in part).
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 Id.
203 Id.
204 Wilson v. Layne, Nos. 98-83, 1999 WL 187365, at *11.
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 Id.
208 Id.
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conduct similar to that in Wilson was not unreasonable. 2 9 The two
federal cases were not reported and, furthermore, were decided on
"'unorthodox non-Fourth Amendment right of privacy theories.2 10
The state case addressed an illegal trespass and it "surely does not
provide any support for an officer's assumption that a similar
trespass would be lawful. 211 Justice Stevens concluded that these
decisions "could not possibly provide a basis for a claim by the
police that they reasonably relied on judicial recognition of an
exception to the basic rule that the purposes of the police intrusion
strictly limited its scope."212
Finally, Justice Stevens found the majority's reliance on United
States Marshal Service's ride-along policy "[t]he most disturbing
aspect of the Court's ruling. 2 3 This document was obviously not
prepared by an attorney, but by someone "concerned with
developing the proper public image of the Service, with a special
interest in creating a favorable impression with Congress."214 The
Justice points out that the document contains no discussion of what
conditions must be present before the media is permitted to enter a
private residence.215 Although it states the media should not be
allowed to enter until a "signal" is given, it fails to provide the
marshal any indication of when and under what circumstances such
signal should be given.216  The notion that a trained law
enforcement officer would rely on such a document for guidance
"it is too far fetched to merit serious consideration."21 7
In conclusion, Justice Stevens, in agreement with the majority,
found that the conduct in this case clearly violated the Fourth
Amendments core purpose - protection of the home.1 8 In his view,
209 Wilson v. Layne, Nos. 98-83, 1999 WL 187365, at *12.
210 Id. (citing Moncrief, 10 Media L. Rptr. 1620; Higbee, 5 Media L. Rptr.
2372).
211 Id. (citing Prahl, 295 N.W.2d 768).
212 Id. at *12.
213 Id.
214 Wilson v. Layne, Nos. 98-83, 1999 WL 187365, at *12.
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 Id.
218 Wilson v. Layne, Nos. 98-83, 1999 WL 187365, at *13.
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however, it had been clearly established that officers may not bring
third parties into private homes during the execution of a
warrant.219 To this end, he states that "[i]n shielding this conduct
as if it implicated only the unsettled margins of our jurisprudence,
the Court today authorizes one free violation of the well-
established rule it reaffirms."2 '
Im. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court decided the Fourth Amendment issue in
Wilson v. Layne correctly because the presence of the reporters
inside the Wilsons' home was not related to the objectives of the
authorized intrusion. However, this decision is not without its
shortcomings. First, although the officers violated the Fourth
Amendment by permitting the media ride-along, the Court failed to
address whether the reporters too infringed on the Wilsons' right of
privacy. Furthermore, the Court's oversight of the clear purpose of
the Fourth Amendment, reinforced by 18 U.S.C. § 3105, lead to an
erroneous conclusion on the issue of qualified immunity.
A. Fourth Amendment Issue
In Wilson, the Supreme Court failed to address the issue of
whether the reporters entry into the Wilsons' home and subsequent
photographing of the events that occurred violated the Fourth
Amendment. The reporters were permitted to enter the private
dwelling by virtue of the authority bestowed upon the officers via
the issuance of the warrant. Since the reporters were acting "under
color of law," their actions likewise constitute a Fourth
Amendment violation.
For a Fourth Amendment violation to occur the government
must conduct a search that violates a citizen's reasonable
expectation of privacy."' A reasonable expectation exists when a
person demonstrates both a subjective and objective expectation of
privacy.222 The subjective expectation of privacy requirement is
met when "the individual has shown that 'he seeks to preserve
219 Id.
220 Id.
221 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
222 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740-41 (1979).
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[something] as private."' 2z For an objective expectation of privacy
to exist, society must recognize the subjective expectation as
"reasonable."224 Both the subjective and objective expectation of
privacy requirements must be met before proceeding to the
governmental action prong of the analysis.
The second prong of the analysis mandates the conduct be
governmental.225 In other words, the Fourth Amendment applies
only to action by the government, not to private conduct. However,
actions of private citizens may be considered governmental when
the citizens are willful participants in the governmental activity,
referred to as "under the color of law." Private citizens act under
color of law when they engage in a joint action with state officials
and thus they are held to the same constitutional constraints as a
traditional governmental actor.226
When applying the two-prong test to media ride-alongs, the
presence of the media violates the Fourth Amendment if the
resident is able to demonstrate a subjective expectation of privacy
that society is willing to recognize as reasonable. 27 Furthermore,
the resident must show that the media are governmental actors
participating in the execution of the warrant.228 When this two-
prong test is met, Fourth Amendment protections apply to the
search of a citizen's home. If the Fourth Amendment is applicable
223 Id. at 740 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 351).
224 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) The second requirement is
met when the individual's expectation is objectively "justifiable" under the
circumstances. Smith, 442 U.S. at 740 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 353).
Furthermore, the importance of the term "reasonableness" can not be
overlooked. "The bottom line in analyzing the constitutionality of any search is
its reasonableness." Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183 (1990).
225 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
226 See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 941 (stating private persons act under color of law
when engaging in a joint activity with state actors).
227 Id. The test, as articulated by the Court is whether "a person [has]
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy ... that society is
prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."'
228 Johnston, supra note 18, at 1507 (citing BLOOM & BRODIN, at 20).
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to the search, one must demonstrate that the search was reasonable
to prevent an invasion of privacy.2 9
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Prong
The home has always received special protection under Fourth
Amendment analysis.23 "The home has properly been regarded as
among the most highly protected zones of privacy,1231 and "the
sanctity of private dwellings [is] ordinarily afforded the most
stringent Fourth Amendment protection."23 2 The very purpose of
the Amendment was to secure a person's right to "retreat into his
home and there be free from unreasonable governmental
searches." 233 Therefore, there is little to no debate as to whether
citizens have a subjective expectation of privacy in their homes.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that an objective
expectation of privacy, an expectation that society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable, exists in the home. 234 To determine if a
subjective expectation exists, the Court "examines the beliefs and
norms of contemporary society. 2 35  The home is considered a
place where an objective expectation of privacy exists, since the
search in Wilson occurred in a private home, there clearly existed a
reasonable expectation of privacy.236
229 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The text of the Fourth Amendment makes it
clear that all searches must be reasonable. Ayeni, 35 F.3d at 684.
230 Maryland v. Garrison, 107 S.Ct. 1013 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting);
See also, Payton, 445 U.S. 573 ("[T]he 'physical entry of the home is the chief
evil which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed,"' (quoting United
States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972)). Justice Ginsburg
has called the home "the most essential bastion of privacy recognized by law."
Minnesota v. Carter, -- U.S. --, 119 S.Ct. 469, 481 (1998) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
231 Ayeni, 35 F.3d at 685. (citing Winston, 470 U.S. at 761-62; Payton, 445
U.S. at 585, 589-90)).
232 Id. (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976);
United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412, 422 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 439 U.S. 913
(1978)).
233 Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
234 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
235 Johnston, supra note 18, at 1508 (citing 1 JOHN WESLEY HALL, JR.,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE, § 2:7, at 60-61 (2nd ed. 1993).
236 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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Government Action Prong
The second prong of the test requires government action."'
Thus, if the individuals participating in the search are local, state,
or federal government officials, the conduct is easily deemed
governmental.238 In Wilson, although the law enforcement officers
were government officials, the reporters were private citizens.
Traditionally, when the participants are private persons, acting
independently of government authority, direction or acquiescence,
Fourth Amendment protections do not apply.239 A search
conducted by or participated in by a private person may, however,
be deemed governmental if the private actors were "acting as an
agent of the Government or with the participation or knowledge of
any governmental official."24 Thus, in order for a private search to
become a governmental action, the private citizen must have acted
as an "instrument" or agent of the state.241
A private citizen acts "under color of law" if they exercise a right
"possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because
the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law. ' 242 The
injury, in this case the invasion of privacy, must have been caused
by the exercise of a right created by the state, by a rule of conduct
imposed by the state or by a person for whom the state is
responsible. 43 A private person is acting under color of law if they
are willful participants in ajoint activity with the government or its
237 Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. at 475 (stating that the Fourth
Amendment "was intended as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign
authority, and was not intended to be a limitation upon other than governmental
agencies").
238 Johnston, supra note 18, at 1509 (citing BLOOM & BRODIN, at 20).
239 Id.
240 United States v. Jacobson, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (quoting Walter v.
United States, 447 U.S. 649, 662 (1980) (Blackrnun, J., dissenting)).
241 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487 (1971).
242 Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326.
243 See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937 (stating that private persons' acts may be
considered under color of law if such are joint actions between private and state
actors). The elements of a Bivens claim are similar except that the party acted
under color of federal law. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
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agents.2" The question thus becomes whether the reporters were
governmental actors, acting under color of law, when they
accompanied the law enforcement officials on the execution of a
search warrant? Under this analysis, the media members are
private citizens acting under color of law because they are willful
and joint participants in government action.245
First, without the government's action, the execution of the
search warrant, the media coverage of the search would not have
occurred. Without the warrant, the media would require the
Wilsons' consent to gain access to the interior of the home. It was
the show of authority by the officers under color of law that
allowed the media access to the residence. Furthermore, the
Washington Post reporters were "invited by the Marshals to
accompany them on their mission." '246 Without the assistance of the
law enforcement officials, the media would not have known a
search was to occur. It was only through the willful and voluntary
cooperation between the government officials and the media that
the reporters were able to document the search. "It is the
government's execution of a search warrant that serves as the
necessary prerequisite to the media's coverage." '247 Thus, the media
acted under color of law when they accompanied law enforcement
officials during the execution of a search of the private residence.2"
In contrast, others legal scholars argue the media was not acting
under color of law because, "[a]t most, [the media]'s acts were
244 See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970) (stating a
private party can be held liable under § 1983 if they are involved in a conspiracy
with a state actor). See also F.E. Trotter, Inc. v. Watkins, 869 F.2d 1312, 1318
(9th Cir. 1989) (holding the scope of immunity available to a private party in a
Bivens action mirrors that available to a private party in a § 1983 action).
245 See Johnston, supra note 18, at 1524.
246 Wilson v. Layne, Nos. 98-83, 1999 WL 187365, at *3.
247 Johnston, supra note 18, at 1524.
248 Id. The author also argues that even if the media are considered
independent actors conducting an independent search, the Fourth Amendment
can still be violated. Id. This issue hinges on 'the consideration of the actual
participation by the government agent in the total enterprise of securing
evidence by other than appropriate means."' Id. at 1525 (quoting 1 HALL, supra
note 235, at § 12:4, at 557). He argues that the police involvement is sufficient
to subject the media's action to Fourth Amendment analysis. Id.
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committed parallel to and contemporaneous with" the government
actions.249 Although the government agents and the camera crew
had an interest in the search, they would argue that the parties'
motives were different. The agents' motives were to collect
evidence, while the camera crew's motive was to obtain a story.
"A coincidence of interest does not transform a search into the type
of concerted involvement that would 'transform [the reporters'
actions] from a private venture [in]to action taken under color of
law."'250 The reporters must be allowed to enter the house with the
common interest of depriving the person of his Fourth Amendment
rights."' If this common interest does not exist, there is merely a
coincidence of interests and the claim must fail.25 2
This argument flies in the face of the Supreme Court's holding in
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Company.253 There the Court held the
Fourth Circuit erred in finding that joint participation required
"something more than invoking the aid of state officials to take
advantage of state-created attachment procedures. 2 4  In Wilson,
the reporters invoked the aid of the law enforcement officials to
take advantage of the warrant allowing access to the interior of the
home. The joint efforts of the media and law enforcement officials
deprived the Wilsons' of their Fourth Amendment right to privacy.
Thus, regardless of the parties' motives, the reporters were private
citizens acting under color of law because they were willful and
joint participants in government action.
249 See Levy, supra note 38, at 1189 (quoting Parker v. Clarke, 905 F. Supp.
at 642). In addition, the author notes that the Eighth Circuit's majority opinion
in Parker affirmed this finding. See Id n. 265.
250 Id. supra note 38, at 1188 (quoting Jones v. Tabibbi, 508 F. Supp. 1069,
1973 (D. Mass. 1981)). The author does note, however, that there is an inherent
tension between Taibbi and Adickes. See id. at n. 261. Although the author
believes the Taibbi approach is correct, he admits that Adickes only requires
"willful participation in joint activity." See id. (citing Adickes, 398 U.S. at 152).
He argues that Taibbi is correct because, "mere joint activity without a common
plan does not add up to a conspiracy." Levy, supra note 38, at n. 261.
251 Id. at 1189.
252 Id.
253 457 U.S. at 942.
254 Id.
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The above analysis demonstrates that the threshold requirements
of the Fourth Amendment were fulfilled by the reporters' presence
during the execution of the warrant. First, a reasonable expectation
of privacy existed during the search of the Wilsons' home.
Furthermore, the media members who accompanied the law
enforcement officials on the search were acting as government
agents because they were willful participants in a joint activity
with the government. Therefore, Fourth Amendment protections
apply and a reasonableness test must be conducted to determine if
a violation of the citizen's constitutional rights have occurred.
Reasonableness Requirement
The Fourth Amendment clearly states that all searches must be
reasonable. 5 This requirement not only prevents government
actors from conducting searches based on unreasonable grounds,
but "to ensure reasonableness in the manner and scope of searches
and seizures that are carried out.2156 Fourth Amendment analysis
requires a determination of whether the media's presence during
the execution of a search warrant is reasonable.
Commentator Brad Johnston finds the media's entrance into a
private citizen's home during the execution of a search warrant a
per se violation of the Fourth Amendment because: 1) the media's
presence exceeds the actions permitted by the search warrant; 2)
the media's presence creates an additional invasion that is
unnecessary; and 3) the media's presence causes an additional
harm. 257
A compelling argument to support the notion that the media's
presence is a per se violation of the Fourth Amendment is that the
media's presence is outside of the warrant's scope. 8 Courts have
255 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
256 Ayeni, 35 F.3d at 684 (citing Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 395
(1989); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1985)).
257 See Johnston, supra note 18, at 1526. The author notes that this list is
not exhaustive, but explain why a per se rule that the media's presence is
unreasonable is needed. See id. at n.123.
258 This was the argument used by the Second Circuit in Ayeni. There, the
court stated that "the unreasonableness of [the officer's] conduct in Fourth
Amendment terms is heightened by the fact that, not only was it wholly lacking
justification based on the legitimate needs of law enforcement, but it was
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consistently held the conduct of law enforcement officials
executing a search warrant is limited to actions expressly
authorized by the warrant, or actions impliedly authorized because
they are reasonably related to accomplishing the authorized search
or accomplishing additional legitimate law enforcement
objectives." 9 The media's presence is thus outside the scope of the
search warrant, because it is not expressly authorized to participate
by the search warrant, nor is it impliedly authorized because it does
not serve a legitimate law enforcement objective.26
In Wilson, the warrant permitted "any duly authorized peace
officer" to aid in the apprehension of Dominic Wilson.261 The
Court acknowledged that the reporters did not assist the police in
achieving their task.262 It stated the reporters "were not present for
any reason related to the justification for policy entry into the home
- the apprehension of Dominic Wilson." '63 Therefore, since the
media are government actors and are unauthorized to be present
during the search the home, their accompaniment of law
enforcement agents during the execution of a warrant violates the
Fourth Amendment.264
Johnston also argues that the media's presence creates an
additional and unnecessary invasion of the home.265 The Fourth
Amendment tries to minimize the invasion of a private home
during the execution of a search warrant by requiring the search to
calculated to inflict injury on the very value that the Fourth Amendment seeks to
protect - the right of privacy. The purpose of bringing the CBS camera crew
into the Ayenis' home was to permit public broadcast of their private premises
and thus to magnify needlessly the impairment of their right of privacy." Ayeni,
35 F.3d at 686.
259 See supra notes 46-47, 158.
260 See Johnston., supra note 18, at 1527-28. The author states that "the
media's presence is nothing more than state-supported trespass." Id. at n. 126.
Since the media cannot enter an individual's home without consent, it is
trespassing when it accompanies the police during the search of a private home.
261 No. 98-83, 1999 WL 320817, at *3.
262 Id. at *6.
263 Id.
264 See Johnston, supra note 18, at 1528.
265 Id. at 1529.
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be reasonably conducted in both intensity and duration.266 The
presence of the media "unnecessarily causes a more intense
invasion of the home," '67 and is thus unreasonable.2
68
Finally, Johnston argues that the most compelling reason for
concluding that the media's presence is unreasonable is the
additional harm caused by the actual invasion of personal privacy
suffered by the citizen as a result of the media's documentation and
publication of the search.2 69  The media, after being allowed to
accompany the officers on the search, now have video footage, or
in this case photographs, of the investigation. These pictures will
headline the evening news and or published in the paper, and the
residents of the home are embarrassed and labeled by the
community.2 0 Most shocking is the fact that the residents have no
immediate recourse to prevent the media from broadcasting the
taped search.271 Unlike filing a motion to suppress evidence
obtained by police officers during a search, residents have no
equivalent to keep the media from using the video it has
obtained.2 72 The author argues that this additional harm will exist
even if the charges are dropped or the resident is acquitted.27
Therefore, because of the additional harm created by the presence
of a camera crew during the execution of a search warrant, a harm
266 Id. (citing 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, §
4.10(d), at 670 (3rd Ed. 1996) "'The permissible intensity of the search within
the described premises is determined by the description of the things to be
seized!" Id. at n. 30 (quoting LAFAVE, at 670. "'[G]iven the longstanding
requirements that the officers remain on the premises only so long as is
reasonably necessary to conduct the search and that they avoid unnecessary
damage to the premises, it would appear that the police are not completely free
to pursue the search in any manner they choose."'). Id. (quoting LAFAVE, at
673-74).
267 Id.
268 Id. at 1530.
269 Id.
270 Id. Although the pictures in Wilson were never published, the potential
for such to occur in this or others cases certainly exists.
271 Id. at 1532.
272 Id.
273 Id. The author adds that, unlike when police illegally seize evidence,
"there is nothing equivalent to the exclusionary rule for private actors like the
media." Id. at 1531.
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over which the residents have no control but is preventable by the
police, media presence violates the Fourth Amendment
reasonableness standard.274
In contrast, the media and proponents of allowing the press to
accompany law enforcement officials during the execution of a
search warrant argue that media presence is reasonable under its
First Amendment right of public access.275 They argue that
"commentary and reporting on the criminal justice system is at the
core of First Amendment values. 276 Such reporting serves many
important functions. For example, an objective served by allowing
the media to accompany officers and fihn the search is to "facilitate
accurate reporting on law-enforcement activities."2 77 In doing so,
the public's "intense need" and "deserved right" to know about the
administration of justice will be fulfilled.278 Furthermore, the
media serves an oversight function that minimizes police abuses, 279
promotes officer safety,280 protects suspects,28' and preserves
274 Id. at 1533.
275 Brief For Petitioners at 22, Hanlon v. Berger, -- U.S. -- (U.S.) (No. 97-
1927); Brief For Respondents Cable News Network, Inc., Turner Broadcasting
System, Inc., Robert Rainey, Donald Hooper, and Jack Hamann in Support of
Petitioners at 24, Hanlon v. Berger, -- U.S. -- (1998) (Nos. 97-1927); Brief
Amici Curiae of ABC, Inc., et. al. In Support of Petitioners in No. 97-1927 and
Respondents in No. 98-83 at 3, Hanlon v. Berger, -- U.S. -- (1998) (Nos. 97-
1927, 98-83). See generally Levy, supra note 111, at 1190 (stating that the
media has at least a limited right of access to cover activities of police officers).
276 Brief For Respondents Cable News Network, Inc. et. al. In Support of
Petitioners at 25, Hanlon, (Nos. 97-1927) (quoting Nebraska Press Ass'n v.
Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 587 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
277 Brief For Petitioners at 24, Hanlon, (Nos. 97-1927) (quoting Wilson v.
Layne, 141 F.3d 111, 118 (4th Cir. 1998)).
278 Brief For Respondents Cable News Network, Inc. et. al. In Support of
Petitioners at 25, Hanlon, (Nos. 97-1927) (quoting Richmond Newspaper, Inc. v.
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 604 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring)).
279 Brief For Respondents Cable News Network, Inc. et. al. In Support of
Petitioners at 32, Hanlon, (Nos. 97-1927); Brief For Petitioners at 24, Hanlon,
(Nos. 97-1927).
280 Brief For Respondents Cable News Network, Inc. et. al. In Support of
Petitioners at 32, Hanlon, (Nos. 97-1927); Brief For Petitioners at 23, Hanlon,
(Nos. 97-1927).
281 Brief For Petitioners at 23, Hanlon, (Nos. 97-1927).
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evidence. 2  Finally, supporters of media documentation and
broadcasting of searches argue that this is a "legitimate law
enforcement objective, for publicizing the fight against crime is
itself a valuable weapon in helping to deter crime.
2 3
While there is little doubt the above goals are important, "the
media has no special privilege to conduct illegal activity, such as
trespass or invasion of privacy, under the protective shield of the
First Amendment. 84 An invasion of privacy does not become
reasonable merely because some benefit is gained from its
videotaping. As the Second Circuit stated, "A private home is not
a soundstage for law enforcement theatricals.
285
Likewise, the Supreme Court in Wilson, although
acknowledging the importance of the media's role in informing the
public about the workings of the justice system, found these
arguments to "fall short of justifying the presence of the media
inside a home.08 6 Justice Stevens' dismissed such arguments as
"post hoc rationalizations.2 87
Thus, the presence of the media during a search of a private
residence, unless authorized through consent or by warrant, is a
violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment
applies to the search of a private residence because individuals
hold both a subjective and objective expectation of privacy in their
home. Furthermore, though the media is not on the government
payroll, they are transformed into government actors, acting under
color of law, when they willfully join law enforcement agents
during the execution of a warrant. Without the assistance of law
282 Brief For Petitioners at 24, Hanlon, (Nos. 97-1927).
283 Brief For Petitioners at 23, Hanlon, (Nos. 97-1927). See also Brief For
Respondents Cable News Network, Inc. et. al. In Support of Petitioners at 29,
Hanlon, (Nos. 97-1927).
284 Kevin E. Lunday, Note, Permitting Media Participation in Federal
Searches: Exploring the Consequences for the United States Following Ayeni v.
Mottola and A Framework For Analysis, 65 G.W.L.R. 278, 303 (1997) (citing
Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132-33 (1937) ('The publisher of a
newspaper has no special immunity from the application of general laws. He
has no special privilege to invade the rights and liberties of others."')).
285 Ayeni, 35 F.3d at 686.
286 No. 98-83, 1999 WL 320817, at *7.
287 Id. at * 10 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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enforcement officers, the media would not be permitted to enter a
home without the consent of its inhabitants. Finally, the media's
presence and photographing of the search is unreasonable,
regardless of any benefits, because its conduct exceeds the
limitations of the warrant and creates additional harm to the
residences. Therefore, had the Court addressed the issue, the
media also violated the Wilsons' Fourth Amendment rights.
B. Qualified Immunity Issue
Turning to the qualified immunity issue, the Supreme Court
erred in holding that it was not unreasonable for a police officer in
April 1992 to have believed that allowing the media to accompany
them on a search was lawful. The test for immunity, in practice, is:
Whether an official protected by qualified immunity
may be held personally liable for an allegedly
unlawful official action generally turns on the
'objective legal reasonableness' of the action,
assessed in light of the legal rules that were 'clearly
established' at the time it was taken.288
Considering the long history of the Fourth Amendment and the
lack of caselaw holding such action permissible, the officers
should have known that allowing media to accompany them into a
private home was unconstitutional.
The majority rests its argument on the notion that this area of
law is undeveloped, and officers cannot be expected to predict the
future course of constitutional law.289 Although, admittedly, the
law is undeveloped in the area of ride-alongs, the Fourth
Amendment has been one of the most highly litigated areas of
constitutional law over the last two hundred years. 29" From this
litigation, it has long been established that:
288 Wilson, No. 98-83, 1999 WL 320817, at *7 (quoting Anderson, 483 U.S.
635, 639 (citation omitted)).
289 Id. at *9. (citations omitted).
290 See BRADFORD P. WILSON, ENFORCING THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT: A JURIS PRUDENTIAL HISTORY 1 (1986).
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[T]he objectives of the Fourth Amendment are to
preserve the right of privacy to the maximum extent
consistent with reasonable exercise of law
enforcement duties and that, in the normal situations
where warrants are required, law enforcement
officers' invasion of the privacy of a home must be
grounded on either the express terms of a warrant or
the implied authority to take reasonable law
enforcement actions related to the execution of the
warrant.
291
In Wilson, the warrant was addressed to "any duly authorized
peace officer."29 2 Thus, as Justice Rehnquist stated, the question
before the Court was "whether the invitation to the media exceeded
the scope of the search authorized by the warrant." '293
The warrants made no mention of the Washington Post reporters
presence or assistance,294 therefore, the media's admittance into
the home was not an express term of the warrant. Furthermore, the
police's actions were not reasonably related to the execution of the
warrant. As the majority stated, "[c]ertainly the presence of
reporters inside the home was not related to the objectives of the
authorized intrusion.""29 Thus, the officers clearly exceeded well
established principles, regardless of the lack of precedent on the
specific issue.
Nonetheless, the majority grasped at straws and cited three cases
which held such conduct was not unreasonable. 296 Of these three
cases, two were unpublished lower court cases and none of them
addressed the Fourth Amendment.297 Justice Stevens dismissed
them as "not possibly" providing a basis for a claim that the police
relied on them as judicial recognition of an exception to the rule
291 Ayeni, 35 F.3d at 686.
292 No. 98-83, 1999 WL 320817, at *3.
293 Id. at *8.
294 No. 98-83, 1999 WL 320817, at *6.
295 Id. at *6.
296 Id. at *8.
297 Id. at * 12 (citations omnmitted).
[Vol. IX:353
40
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 9, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 5
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss2/5
WILSON V LAYNE
that a search is limited to the scope of the warrant.29 Furthermore,
the majority failed to cite a single case that supports the
proposition that such activity could be regarded as a "reasonable"
invasion.299
This position is further supported by § 3105 of the United States
Code."° The section reads:
A search warrant may in all cases be served by any
of the officers mentioned in its direction or by an
officer mentioned by law to serve such warrant, but
by no other person, except in aid of the officer on
his requiring it, he being present and acting in its
execution.3"'
Although this statute addresses who may serve a warrant, "it has
been construed to determine who can execute a warrant."30 2 In
United States v. Clouston, °3 for example, the Sixth Circuit held
298 Id. at *12.
299 Id. at *11.
300 18 U.S.C. § 3105.
301 Id.
302 Ayeni, 35 F.3d at 687 (see United States v. Wright 667 F.2d 793, 797
(9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Clouston, 623 F.2d 485, 486 (6th Cir. 1980);
United States v. Gervato, 474 F.2d 40, 45 (3d Cir. 1973)). Furthermore, the
court supports its conclusion that those not authorized by the warrant may not be
present during its execution by citing: Clouston, 623 F.2d at 486-87; United
States v. Gambino, 734 F. Supp 1084, 1091 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); In re Southeastern
Equipment Co. Search Warrant 746 F. Supp. 1563, 1577 (S.D. Ga. 1990);
United States v. Schwimmer, 692 F. Supp. 119, 126-27 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).
Although § 3105 identifies who may "serve" a warrant, the court cites the
following cases to demonstrate that this section has been construed to determine
who may "execute" a warrant: United States v. Wright 667 F.2d 793, 797 (9th
Cir. 1982); United States v. Clouston, 623 F.2d 485, 486 (6th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Gervato, 474 F.2d 40, 45 (3d Cir. 1973). Id. Furthermore, the court
supports its conclusion that those not authorized by the warrant may not be
present during its execution by citing: Clouston, 623 F.2d at 486-87; United
States v. Gambino, 734 F. Supp 1084, 1091 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); In re Southeastern
Equipment Co. Search Warrant, 746 F. Supp. 1563, 1577 (S.D. Ga. 1990);
United States v. Schwimmer, 692 F. Supp. 119, 126-27 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).
303 623 F.2d at 486-87.
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that a telephone company employee's presence during a search was
reasonable based on § 3105 because he was there assisting officers
in identifying property. In Wilson, the media had only a self-
serving purpose."
Thus, based on the history of the Fourth Amendment and the
lack of caselaw supporting the reasonableness of media presence,
the Supreme Court erred in finding the officers entitled to qualified
immunity. As stated by Justice Stevens, the Court permitted "one
free violation of the well-established rule that it reaffirmed."
IV. IMPACT
The obvious holding in Wilson is that police violate the Fourth
Amendment when they permit members of the media or other third
parties to accompany them into a home during the execution of a
warrant when the presence of the third parties was not in aid of the
execution of the warrant.3 s The Court's decision, however, leaves
many questions still unanswered. This section will address the
impact of the Court's holding, not only on the media, but on other
third parties as well.
First, the decision is likely to limit, if not end, the media's
participation in the execution of a warrant in a private home.
Unless the media obtains consent from the private citizen or can
show that its presence furthers the objective of the warrant, their
participation in the execution of a warrant will be found
unconstitutional. "Cops" Executive Producer John Langley
however, stated that he expects the reality-based show to go
unchanged because they "obtain releases from everyone involved
in [their] program.""3 6 Although on its face such a practice appears
to constitute an obstruction of justice, the Court suggested it was
aware of the possibility during oral arguments. 7
304 No. 98-83, 1999 WL 320817, at *7.
305 Id. at *6.
306 See Greg Braxton, Producers Say Ruling Won't Effect Shows Television:
'Cops' and others claim privacy issues are already addressed, L.A. Times, May
26, 1999 at F4.
307 United States Supreme Court Official Transcript at 23, Wilson v. Layne,
1998 WL 187365 (U.S.) (No. 98-83).
394 [Vol. IX:353
42
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 9, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 5
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss2/5
WILSON V LAYNE
As the Marshals Service argued that the media's presence is a
means of protecting citizens from potential police abuse, the Court
suggested that officers just ask the homeowner before bringing the
news crew into the home if the residents desire such means of
protection." 8 Although difficult to tell if such a resolution was
seriously suggested, the possibility of this situation arising
remains. If it did, however, there would be no Fourth Amendment
question because the resident consented to the media's presence.
Moreover, the Court dismissed generalized notions that the
media's presence served legitimate law enforcement purposes.30 9
Although the media's presence may serve such purposes in a
general sense, "that is not the same as furthering the purposes of
the search."31 Unless, in the future, the media can show that its
presence aids in the execution in a more specific nature, it will not
be allowed to accompany law enforcement officers during the
execution of a warrant.
A significant question arising from the Court's holding is in what
situations is the presence of third parties directly aiding in the
execution of a warrant. In Wilson, the majority recognized that in
certain situations third parties do aid in the execution of a
warrant. " For example, a third party is permitted to accompany
law enforcement officials for the purpose of identifying stolen
goods.31 In oral arguments, the Court posed the question of
whether law enforcement trainees were permitted to enter a
home." 3 In a hypothetical, the Court stated that the optimum
number of officers for this particular hypothetical search was five,
but the officers brought along two police trainees who were present
just to watch.3"4 Would their presence, notwithstanding the fact
that they were officers, constitute a Fourth Amendment violation?
What if the individual to be arrested became violent and the
308 Id.
309 No. 98-83, 1999 WL 320817, at *6.
310 Id.
311 Id.
312 Id. (citing Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (K.B. 1765)).
313 United States Supreme Court Official Transcript at 47, Wilson v. Layne,
1998 WL 187365 (U.S.) (No. 98-83).
314 Id.
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trainees were needed to subdue the suspect? Would their presence
then constitute an invasion of privacy? These questions exemplify
the gray area in the Court's holding.
Finally, after announcing it was unconstitutional for the police to
allow the media to accompany them on a search, in a footnote the
Court stated that "the violation of the Fourth Amendment is the
presence of the media and not the presence of the police in the
home." However, the Court stated it had "no occasion here to
decide whether the exclusionary rule would apply to any evidence
discovered or developed by the media representatives." Had the
Court decided the issue of whether the media violated the Fourth
Amendment as posited above, the answer to this question would be
clear.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court decided the Fourth Amendment issue in
Wilson v. Layne correctly because the presence of the reporters
inside the Wilsons' home was not related to the objectives of the
authorized intrusion. The Court, however, erred in finding the
officers entitled to qualified immunity by failing to acknowledge
the clearly established rule that searches must be conducted within
the parameters authorized by the warrant. The reporters' presence
in the Wilsons' home was self-serving and clearly exceeded the
warrant's scope. In conclusion, it is too early to tell how great an
impact the Court's holding will have on "reality" television or ride-
alongs in general. If nothing more, the Wilson decision will make
it more difficult for the media and other third parties to obtain
access to a private dwelling and, in turn, continue to uphold the
sanctity of our homes.
Ronald B. Kowalczyk
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